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Posted by: james ® 05/08/2002, 20:20:37 Author Profile Mail author |
Today a very interesting thought occured to me. Being raised Mormon I always thought that criminals had 'free will' to choose NOT to do crime, but just choose not to. (don't laugh...I am being honest here with my upbringing) It seems to me now that institutions such as the Legal system and mental institutions are societies 'answer' to assuming responsibility for those that are unable to live by societal standards. It seems to me that the concepts of 'free-will' and 'personal responsibility' are much more complex than what I was raised to believe, and still have believed for a long time, even after not being involved with the LDS faith. I honestly believe that people don't want to do wrong, they just 'need help' in abiding by the rules. That there are reasons why individuals seem to lack a conscience, and these reasons are beyond their control. Just as law abiding people didn't have control for creating their condition. I think it might be good to have someone 'cross examine' my observations, to see if there is something I am not understanding. J |
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Replies to this message
Free Will and Concience. Re: Free will & institutions -- james Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Çhâñgelîñg ®
05/09/2002, 06:45:22
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Whist I think there is logic in your question, I also think that this freewill you assume has societal influences can be misconstrued as some criminals really are aware of their wrong doings, but calculate the statistics on the chance of their being caught. They may in fact have some concience, but perhaps greed has precidence? I don't think upbringing is always the answer to an individuals outlook. As I'm sure you like myself, have encountered the preist, or the police officer with a son who seems to hate his father and will take the opposite path.
It isn't always just blind rebellion, and our children do not always follow the teachings of their parents. Perhaps if parents could view their children as completely different individuals, and not some clone of their own perceptions, some progress could be made?
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Evidence? Re: Free Will and Concience. -- Çhâñgelîñg Top of thread Archive
Posted by: James ®
05/10/2002, 20:37:12
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Interesting, some disorders are characterized as a lack of conscience. Read the following description of "Anti-social personality disorder" The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, pp. 649-650) describes Antisocial Personality Disorder as a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the
following:*failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest;
*deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure;
*impulsivity or failure to plan ahead;
*irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults;
*reckless disregard for safety of self or others; .
*consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations;
*lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.
The individual is at least 18 years, there is evidence of Conduct Disorder with onset before age 15 years, and the occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of Schizophrenia or a Manic Episode
I have lived with such an individual, and it was very, very stressful. Believe me, a person with this disorder never admits that they are wrong about anything. This person has done some very terrible things to me and others without feeling the slightest guilt at all. I am not saying its right, but I honestly believe that he didn't know that his actions were wrong, and honestly believed that other people were worthy of mistreatment.
There is however a healthy represention of this type. (see advenurous)
http://www.geocities.com/ptypes/index.htmlSo, the question is how does one manifest the positive side of any particular personality style? If any will is exterted I don't think its 'free' but its dependent upon a lot of factors, most of which I think is beyond a persons control.
Ok, what about the person who hates the upbringing of his/her parents? Maybe it really wasn't that great.Maybe the parents made the children believe it was, but in reality they were manifesting their own emotional baggage.
j
Modified by James at Fri, May 10, 2002, 20:49:28
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Question James? Re: Evidence? -- James Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Jersey Girl ®
05/10/2002, 21:08:19
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James,
Feel free to decline answering this question but I have to ask it. The person you mention, do you know if there was any history of alcoholism in their childhood on the part of their parent?
Vicki
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Answer Re: Question James? -- Jersey Girl Top of thread Archive
Posted by: james ®
05/13/2002, 18:39:59
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Vicki,
No, I do not know anything of the persons prior history. The last I saw of this person, he claimed to be recovering from a cocaine addiction. This was about 12 years ago. He told so many lies I don't know if this was true or not. In fact I am not absolutely certain that he ever told me his 'real name'...j
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Determinism (still waiting on soft-determinists..) Re: Free will & institutions -- james Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/10/2002, 21:05:50
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James:
The discussion on free-will comes up periodically here. Not too long ago I posted a VERY LONG post on the atonement of Christ, particularly considering the profound philosophical implications of the scientific notion of determinism.This is the link: http://www.anyboard.net/soc/2think/archive/3514.html#3514
There are a few posters in this community who adopt an idea labeled "soft-determinism" through which they justify the use of judicial systems in judging and condemning "offenders." I questioned this position because it most definitely is unjust simply for the partiality on which it is founded.
You may want to look up soft-determinism to get a clearer idea of this discussion. It is very relevant to your post.
I most definitely am of the opinion that judicial systems are convenient and useful to maintain social order, but they are fundamentally unjust in that people do not really choose their action, but rather action is determined by genetic predisposition and conditioning through learning. If an individual is condemned then his parents and all those from whom he learned should share responsibility in the condemnation. They don't. That is not just. If you had a robot that killed someone because it was programmed to, and you couldn't reprogram it what would you do? YOu would probably arrest the creator and destroy the robot..right? But we don't arrest the human robot's makers, nor the programmers, we heap all the condemnation on the robot alone.
TV
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What is justice in a hard-determined universe? Re: Determinism (still waiting on soft-determinists..) -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: someone ®
05/10/2002, 23:52:20
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The condemnation is every bit hard-determined as the "crime".
The credibility of your argument seems rooted in the ability to reduce the criminal to robot status, while maintaining the jury as "you" and "we"; entities for which free-will seems implicit and necessary to carry out the ideal of justice. You remove the idea of crime by removing the cannotations of free will from the "criminal", likewise, I'd argue by the same reasoning the idea of "justice" would dissolve if you appropriatly removed the suggestions of free-will from the jury.
I think it would would be more accurate, but far less convincing to illustrate as follows:
robot (a) terminates robot (b). Robots (c), (d), and (e) programmed (a) according to their own set of descision proceedures defined by robots (f) and (g). Robots (p), (q), and (r) will terminate (a), (c), (d), and (e), (a) only, or alternatively (p) and (q) will terminate (r) and celebrate with a cold beer; the action depending on the hardwiring of (x) and (y), the robots who codified (p),(q), and (r).
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Re: What is justice in a hard-determined universe? Re: What is justice in a hard-determined universe? -- someone Top of thread Archive
Posted by: someone ®
05/10/2002, 23:57:50
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by the way, careful when speaking about terrifying robots killing "someone"; might give me bad dreams. ;)
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Justice's logic should not be self-contradictory Re: What is justice in a hard-determined universe? -- someone Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/11/2002, 06:48:51
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Someone:
You said the following (I will bold particular points):
The condemnation is every bit hard-determined as the "crime".
The credibility of your argument seems rooted in the ability to reduce the criminal to robot status, while maintaining the jury as "you" and "we"; entities for which free-will seems implicit and necessary to carry out the ideal of justice. You remove the idea of crime by removing the connotations of free will from the "criminal", likewise, I'd argue by the same reasoning the idea of "justice" would dissolve if you appropriately removed the suggestions of free-will from the jury.
There is no doubt that in a judicial system the jury and judge are just as ultimately void of free will as the criminal. I never maintained that they were not, nor is my argument hinge on this fact. I do not view the jury or judge as guilty because of their partiality, but rather I am debating the validity of the idea of justice itself.
I do not agree that in a deterministic world the concept of justice cannot exist. It can exist as a program. We perceive justice based on a specific logic. This logic is no different than a computer program yielding specific results in terms of emotional responses, action, and the lack of these.
I would argue that the mental concept (or the logic) currently used and accepted by our nation (if not instinctively by all humans) is self-contradictory.
Our sense of justice is based on cognitive programs in place to avoid being: hurt, put in danger, killed, cheated, etc... The basis of justice can be put simply as: If you do (or don't do) "X" then you deserve to be punished as retribution. This cognitive response to others' behavior includes all sorts of emotional responses that act as stimulus in determining a course of action. Of course if you look at it carefully it is all just as much of a computer (cognitive) program as committing the crime, as you pointed out.
Our sense of justice allows us to condemn the perpetrator of crime because certain criteria pertaining to the logic of our mental program defining justice are met, and because we subjectively feel this to be "right." The problem is that when we "learn" (are conditioned to understand) that free-will is illusionary and that in reality choices are determined by genetics and learning (conditioning) our criteria of justice MUST AUTOMATICALLY INCORPORATE ALL THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES in order to be harmonious and not self-contradictory.
The sense of justice our mind is equipped with does not foresee partiality. No one is allowed to cheat.
Hence, I argue that our system of justice, and the soft-determinists view as well, is rooted in self-contradiction in that it closes its eyes to parties that are also responsible for what we perceive as criminal action because they are not the one's acting directly, and declares that it is justified in this partiality.
I say that it is not justified in so doing but that rather this is a necessary measure to keep order in society, and that it is not true justice according to the logic upon which our subjective concepts of justice are based.
Soft-determinists choose to adopt a logical system for justice that does not correspond to the instinctive sense of justice rooted in the minds of humans, but it insists on claiming the subjective cognitive reward of feeling and perceiving itself as just. They want it both ways.
TV
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contradictions arn't computable Re: Justice's logic should not be self-contradictory -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: someone ®
05/12/2002, 00:23:35
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Ok, I think I understand your position a lot better; actually, I didn't really think you would miss something like failing to deny free will in the case of the jury.
If I understand you correctly, you don't see any idealism in "justice", no abstract metaphysical justice, but simply our conditioning to make others hurt who have hurt us. However, our program is interrupted by another program which dishes out a diminished set of consequences.
Sounds like a case of cognotive dissonance? I don't understand though, why the resolution would necessarily have to be giving ourselves up to the primitive conception of justice, couldn't evolutionary forces take us either way? Wouldn't it be impossible to predict?
program A is a low- level program which directs us to form imperatives. Program A is 'designed' with this hurt-those-who-hurt-us logic gates. On a higher level, under the direction of A, we form specific statements of justice by which we operate.
Somehow or another, we fall short in forming statements of justice that are generated by Prog A. Well, the only way such a thing could possibly happen is due to Prog B. Call it a virus, mutation, or whatever, but some lower-level program must be responsible for generating statements of justice that contradict Prog A.
So we have high-level ethical operations that are inconsistent with lower level programing, but in the mind's entirety, there is no inconsistency as inconsistencies are not computational. Barring a Prog C, over time, we either live with the 'confusion' or one of the two low-level ethical programs wins out. It could be either. For Prog B to win out, either statements generated by A would have to be dissolved or incorperated into B by conditioning B; the lower level programming literally adapting, evolving in part through feedback from higher level operations. This way, Prog A and Prog B would be rough distinctions as both could very well be changing.
The use of the word justice then might be sort of an eqivocation. More like Justice (A) and Justice (B).
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Program B is our ignorance of the facts Re: contradictions arn't computable -- someone Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/12/2002, 22:08:43
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Dear Someone:
You make good points, though I had to read carefully to understand what you meant... I think you are right that we do have a major cognitive directive: "hurt those who hurt you." This sense of vengeance is most definitely an inherited adaptation that allows us to better protect ourselves and families from aggressors, but it is also implicitly connected to other cognitive circuits which allow us to identify the aggressor.
You mentioned that when we fail to formulate a program that is completely just it is because of program B's interference.... I think translated into my minds way of saying it, program B is our ignorance of the fact that men are not free agents.
There is in fact a program X in there that tells us that we are free agents, and so are others. We subjectively perceive ouselves as free to choose, becuase we view our consciousness as the generator of choices rather than seeing our consciousness as the result of the invisible computations occuring in the subconscious. This very sense of agency justifies in our mind the sense of vengeance we feel. In the very moment information were present in our mind telling us that people do things based on their mental program because agency doesn't really exist, this introduces a new factor in our own program that will alter our own decisions and feelings...
Instinctively, because genetics are powerful stuff in the brain, even though I may know that man really doesn't have agency, I may still feel angry at someone who does something bad to me. I really don't have a choice but to feel angry until the level of my conditioning is such that I am able to override the genetic instinct that nature has provided me.
TV
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First, a repost on soft determinism Re: Determinism (still waiting on soft-determinists..) -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Martin ®
05/11/2002, 02:50:54
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Dear Vines, I'm reposting my earlier reply to you on soft determinism to set the stage for my subsequent reply...
During the lengthy philosophical history of the issue of free will, determinism, and ethical responsibility, two of the several positions that have received the most attention are commonly referred to as "Hard Determinism" and "Soft Determinism". This nomenclature is less than optimal, but if we were to arbitrarily redefine them or create neologisms for those well established views, we will be stepping on history and sowing unnecessary confusion. I really HATE overloading philosophical terms with new meanings! (Richard Rorty's arbitrary redefinition of the term "pragmatism" is one of the worst intellectual crimes in modern philosophical history and I will not be a party to such things.) Anyway...
Both hard and soft determinists are "strict determinists". That is, they both hold that there are no uncaused events and that each event is a product of antecedent causes and nothing else. As such, since human brain activity and consciousness are an inseparable part of a vast chain of antecedent causes, humans are completely incapable of creating novel event chains that are somehow free -- no matter how minimally -- of antecedent causes.
The frequent objection of scientifically minded people that quantum mechanics tells us that some events are probabilistic is entirely irrelevant in my view, since humans are just as incapable of freely altering the probabilities of microscopic quantum events as they are of freely altering the flow of macroscopic events. Quantum indeterminacy is thus utterly irrelevant to the questions we are discussing, which centers instead on ethical culpability and the question of whether human beings can act non-causally.
Hard Determinism is the view that because human decisions and choices are a direct result of antecedent causes that are completely beyond our power to control (which at most only falsely appear to be under our control), assigning ethical responsibility to an individual is meaningless and arbitrary. This view entails three fundamental claims:
(1) "Free will" is defined as the human ability to create new event chains at least partially ex nihilo, free and independent to some extent from pre-existing event chains.In other words, the impossibility of genuinely free choice of the kind defined in (1) precludes ethical culpability.(2) Moral and ethical culpability requires that humans be capable of this kind of ultimate free will, since such culpability can only be assigned to the actual originator of an event chain that leads to morally or ethically objectionable consequences.
(3) That because this kind of free will is impossible, there ARE no such "originators" and thus no human being is morally or ethically culpable for their actions.
Soft Determinism is the view I hold and it differs from Hard Determinism in one absolutely pivotal way. Like hard determinists, soft determinists strongly hold that every event in the Universe is a direct consequence of antecedent causes and therefore humans are incapable of creating novel causes or event chains independently by any act of will or choice. Free will thus remains an illusion, albeit a natural and very comforting one.
However, soft determinists do NOT hold that ultimate free will in the sense defined above is required for moral culpability! I and my soft determinist peers instead hold that all that is required for ethical responsibility is circumstantial freedom of action. In other words, a person need only be:
(a) Free of restraintsfor that person to be held morally responsible for their actions or failures to act. A person need not be the true "originator" of an event chain to be ethically culpable for an event chain that includes his or her actions or deliberate inaction.(b) Cognizant of the implications, i.e., able to recognize an event chain that could reasonably be expected to produce a morally objectionable consequence as a result of acting OR failing to act,
(c) Circumstantially "capable" of sufficiently interfering with the event chain so as to avoid or mitigate an ethically objectionable outcome,
That should be enough to understand at least the basics of my position as a soft determinist. In my next reply, I will take up Vines' challenge to defend that position.
- Martin
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Assigning culpability under soft determinism Re: Determinism (still waiting on soft-determinists..) -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Martin ®
05/11/2002, 03:35:01
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Dear Vines, In order to understand the soft determinist position, you MUST keep clear in your mind that we do not disagree on the question of universal determinism itself. Therefore, as brought out in my repost above, I DO NOT claim that moral responsibility may be applied on the basis of the offender being the ultimate originator of an unethical or illegal act. Clearly, I must have an entirely different theory of assessing culpability.
And I do. It is this: Every unrestrained person cognizant of the likely outcome of their actions is nevertheless circumstantially free to act to alter that outcome. And if they act or refuse to act to avoid an immoral or illegal outcome, they can and should be held responsible.
Think of it this way: We both agree that no one possesses free will, that what most people think of as free will is actually a combination of our brain physiology, brain states, and our experiences producing a series of outputs. Yet part of all that is "moral reasoning" (for the lack of a better term) as a result of our heritage of evolutionary adaptations and our own life experiences. Surely you can see that these are also inputs to our behavior.
If we were to excise all that learning and sociobiological heritage and make it impossible for humans to ever learn them again, then and ONLY THEN would there be would no purpose in making moral judgements. It is the very act of assigning moral or legal culpability to circumstantially free actions that serves to interfere to some extent with other event chains that may produce an immoral or illegal act in the future!
Were we NOT to make moral or legal judgements -- even considering that the perpetrator cannot be considered ultimately responsible for their acts -- it would inevitably lead to additional violations.
You see, although no person can create an ex nihilo event chain, the actions, judgements, and opinions of oneself or others can certainly interfere with any number of event chains. The knowledge of an actor that their actions or failures to act may well be met with personal or social condemnation or even the severe restrictions to their physical liberty is -- very, very obviously -- an input to the actual event chain that will unfold and may well direct it to a less harmful outcome.
Thus, assigning culpability is the means by which society can positively interfere with a vast array of potentially harmful event chains.
The main point is, that in the absence of physical or cognitive restraints as I referred to in my previous post, the assignation of moral culpability -- however unjustified in an absolute sense -- serves as a powerful set of "inputs" that can modify the path of any future immoral or illegal event chain. And THAT is why we MUST assign blame and exact penalties! And that by so doing, we are in a very real if pragmatic sense JUSTIFIED in assigning culpability.
So to take up your robot analogy, if we programmed the robot to kill but ALSO programmed it for moral reasoning, if it still went ahead and killed someone it would most emphatically be morally culpable for ignoring or overriding it's moral programming.
- Martin
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Re: Assigning culpability under soft determinism Re: Assigning culpability under soft determinism -- Martin Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/11/2002, 07:22:47
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Dear Martin:
First of all, it was very clear from the start to me that sot-determinism was absolutely rooted in determinism as far as causation is concerned. I had no doubt that soft-determinists did not view perpetrators of crime as the originators of the actual criminal act itself.
As to the soft determinist argument, I must confess that I feel it is poorly thought out. Why?
1) There is no congruent definition of circumstantial freedom in determinism. There are no degrees in freedom. Determinism annihilates the concept of freedom. The two cannot co-exist.
2) Moral reasoning is only one of the components of our total cognitive program determining our action, and cannot have preferential treatment above the other components. You are treating "moral reasoning" with a different set of rules. When you say:
So to take up your robot analogy, if we programmed the robot to kill but ALSO programmed it for moral reasoning, if it still went ahead and killed someone it would most emphatically be morally culpable for ignoring or overriding it's moral programming.
you make a tremendous mistake. The concept of overriding the way you expressed it is based on free-will. You base your idea of moral culpability on the illusion of the possibility that a robot could override anything when such a thing is impossible. The robot overrides what it is programmed to override and does not choose anything.
3) The soft-determinist view is a self-contradictory logical system if applied within the realm of the human mind (see my resonse to someone). It insists on condemning the perpertrator of criminal acts and ignoring those who programmed the acts. The latter are allowed to cheat justice.
As I said to Someone:
I argue that our system of justice, and the soft-determinists view as well, is rooted in self-contradiction in that it closes its eyes to parties that are also responsible for what we perceive as criminal action because they are not the one's acting directly, and declares that it is justified in this partiality.
I say that it is not justified in so doing but that rather this is a necessary measure (but unjust nevertheless) to keep order in society, and that it is not true justice according to the logic upon which our subjective concepts of justice are based.
Soft-determinists choose to adopt a logical system for justice that does not correspond to the instinctive sense of justice rooted in the minds of humans, but it insists on claiming the subjective cognitive reward of feeling and perceiving itself as just. They want it both ways.
---------------------------------
Obviously, there is no choice we are aware of at this time but to adopt a judicial system that allows us to change the course of future events so as to limit the possibilities of harmful courses of events, as you rightly expressed. However, you must concede that this is not true justice according to our instinctual concept of justice. The soft-determinist view has one foot in determinism and one foot out because of these absurd concepts of moral culpability and circumstantial freedom. In reality, man has no freedom, only a program, and our instinctual sense of justice tells us that condemning the executor of the program and not the programmer is not just. To say the contrary is negating the instinct natural selection has endowed us with.
TV
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Preliminary to meeting your challenge Re: Re: Assigning culpability under soft determinism -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Cal ®
05/12/2002, 01:06:13
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Maybe you've underestimated what it means to be a human robot (not to mention a Neanderthal or a chimpanzee robot).
At any rate, here are some comments on your response to Martin's example of the "morally culpable" robot whose moral program fails to override its kill program.
You write: You [Martin] make a tremendous mistake. The concept of overriding the way you expressed it is based on free will . . . on the illusion of the possibility that a robot could override anything when such a thing is impossible. The robot overrided what it is programmed to override and does not choose anything.
1. It's not clear that having been programmed precludes a capacity for choice. One could, for example, be programmed by a sufficiently excellent programmer precisely to be able make choices. In our case, natural selection may well be this programmer. It may have (blindly!) programmed us to be the sort of beings that do in fact exercise a capacity to choose.
2. Why is it impossible "that a robot could override anything"? What does it mean to say that the robot "overrided what it is programmed to override and does not choose anything"? Some comments on this score:
(a) The robot who kills has overriden something, i.e., the moral program. The same goes for the robot whose moral program trumps the kill program.
(b) Must all "robots" by definition only override what they've been programmed to override? Even Big Blue, a thoroughly deterministic system vastly simpler than any human, provides a counterexample to this: The programmers didn't play the game that beat Kasparov, nor could they ever have done so.
Compare the programmers of Big Blue to natural selection, and Big Blue to us. Big Blue and its programmers are much closer in aim than are natural selection (plus the laws of physics, etc.) and human beings. Why? Because the whole task of winning chess is so incredibly much simpler than the tasks of a human "robot". Big Blue's programmers have a clearly specified aim that they share with their robot, while the connection between our actual programmer, natural selection, etc., and our aims is vastly more indirect.
(c) Natural selection in our case seems to have needed to produce a highly flexible being capable of making genuine choices.
Perhaps you've underestimated what's required for a programmer such as Mother Nature to produce a human robot. Perhaps you're confusing the deterministic systems that produce humans with the kinds of determinism that we find in computers or arachnids or even microwave ovens.
Perhaps, in other words, your intuitions are working here in the same way that anti-evolutionists' intuitions work when they fail to believe evolution happened because they can't imagine the time-scales involved in its occurrence. Mightn't it be possible that deterministic processes can produce genuine agents? Mother Nature at least seems to have managed that in our case.
----
I could go on. I think the idea that determinism and freedom are necessarily incompatible has many more problems than those I've suggested here. But let's leave it at this for a start.
At any rate, Vines, I think your posts have been carrying this BB these past few months.
Cal
Modified by Cal at Sun, May 12, 2002, 01:16:24
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Interesting points Re: Preliminary to meeting your challenge -- Cal Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/12/2002, 20:46:28
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Dear Cal:
Thanks for your response. You make some interesting points, and I think I understand your position. I don't think I agree with you. Let me think as I write... (Cal italicized, bolding added)
1. It's not clear that having been programmed precludes a capacity for choice. One could, for example, be programmed by a sufficiently excellent programmer precisely to be able make choices. In our case, natural selection may well be this programmer. It may have (blindly!) programmed us to be the sort of beings that do in fact exercise a capacity to choose.
I agree that a robot can be programmed to make choices, but these choices are made within the bounds of parameters set by the programmer. If the choices are not motivated by a program, then they are not choices. A choice would indicate the ability to determine a preselected course of action, and that is exactly the purpose of the program.
2. Why is it impossible "that a robot could override anything"? What does it mean to say that the robot "overrided what it is programmed to override and does not choose anything"? Some comments on this score:
(a) The robot who kills has overriden something, i.e., the moral program. The same goes for the robot whose moral program trumps the kill program.
(b) Must all "robots" by definition only override what they've been programmed to override? Even Big Blue, a thoroughly deterministic system vastly simpler than any human, provides a counterexample to this: The programmers didn't play the game that beat Kasparov, nor could they ever have done so.
Compare the programmers of Big Blue to natural selection, and Big Blue to us. Big Blue and its programmers are much closer in aim than are natural selection (plus the laws of physics, etc.) and human beings. Why? Because the whole task of winning chess is so incredibly much simpler than the tasks of a human "robot". Big Blue's programmers have a clearly specified aim that they share with their robot, while the connection between our actual programmer, natural selection, etc., and our aims is vastly more indirect.
(c) Natural selection in our case seems to have needed to produce a highly flexible being capable of making genuine choices.
The robot that overrides the moral program and kills does so based on another program (the one to kill). If it chooses one executive program order over another it does so because of a specific reason specified in the program. This process cannot be determined by randomness because that would contradict the idea of choice itself. Robots can only override what they have been programmed to.
As to Big Blue, that is a good example of a deterministic system learning. The program in BB allows it to learn. It is programmed to learn that it may accomplish its main objective: to win. As BB learns, it expands its program with new data with which to determine future moves. Similarly humans have the ability to learn, and the way we learn is in fact largely determined by the underlying program given us by our genes.
The statement: Natural selection in our case seems to have needed to produce a highly flexible being capable of making genuine choices, is misleading at best, IMO. What do you mean by highly flexible? And what exactly is a genuine choice? You basically seem to be stating that humans can make choices that are independent of their program (you may not be, but that's what it sounds like), and I disagree. It is true that as humans our program is dynamic, constantly changing because of learning (conditioning), but that is exactly the point I was making. Learning is not exclusively an inner process. Most of the data through which we learn comes from the outside, including other people. Y influences Z into making certain choices, but Y was influenced by X, and X by W, and so forth. How can we arbitrarily decide when responsibilty stops?
We fool ourselves conveniently by saying that this regress doesn't apply because people make their own choices.... In reality it is impossible to trace the history of causation behind a person's actions. This void of knowledge is part of the reason why judicial systems are in essence based on contradiction, though they are an essential part of the order in our current type of society.
Perhaps you're confusing the deterministic systems that produce humans with the kinds of determinism that we find in computers or arachnids or even microwave ovens.
Can you distinguish between kinds of deterministic systems, in the sense of there being various types of determinism? The kind of determinism that we find in computers is in essence exactly the type working in the brain, because there are no different types of determinism.
Mightn't it be possible that deterministic processes can produce genuine agents? Mother Nature at least seems to have managed that in our case.
What is a genuine agent? A person that can choose a course of action independent of a program? A person that can override consciously the laws of cause and effect as specified by physics? No such a thing is impossible. Mother nature may seem to have produced this because as humans we are unaware of the workings of our cerebral computer below the conscious level, which are determining our actions. What seems is not real.
TV
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What follows if we're programmed to the core? Re: Interesting points -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Cal ®
05/16/2002, 11:12:31
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Not what we usually think? Maybe we rely on those deterministic systems that we understand well, i.e., simple ones compared to us, to imagine what it means for us to be determined. That was the point of saying you confused deterministic systems like current computers, spiders or thermostats with the human one.
At any rate, you write: The statement, Natural selection in our case seems to have needed to produce a highly flexible being capable of making genuine choices, is misleading at best, IMO. What do you mean by "highly flexible"? And what exactly is a genuine choice? You basically seem to be stating that humans can make choices that are independent of their program . . . and I disagree. It is true that as humans our program is dynamic, constantly changing because of learning (conditioning), but that is exactly the point I was making. Learning is not exclusively an inner process. Most of the data through which we learn comes from the outside, including other people. Y influences Z into making certain choices, but Y was influenced by X, and X by W, and so forth. How can we arbitrarily decide when responsibility stops?
1. I'll start with your objections to the idea that we have genuine choices.
(a) I'm not saying that we "can make choices independent of [our] programs." I'm suggesting that we make genuine choices in virtue of the kind of programming that constitutes us.
This is the point of indicating that, though we may be determined, it doesn't follow that our way of being determined shares the unfreedom characteristic of a thermostat or arachnid.
(b) I wonder if your conception of learning as conditioning biases you towards the view that we're unfree. "Conditioning" conjures images of Pavlov's dogs and Skinner's pigeons. At any rate, the idea that all learning is conditioning seems to be limiting. Is it "conditioning" through which a child learns a language, or through which physicists learn how to master the equations of their field and to think through ways to test novel theories?
(c) I am especially curious as to why learning has to be "exclusively an inner process" for us to be free. This idea is strange to me. Even when, as a Mormon, I believed in some kind of extra-natural willing faculty intervening to disturb the causal order, I never thought learning had to come only from within in some way.
What in the world would it be for anyone to learn in this exclusively inner way? Why would its impossibility suggest we're unfree?
It seems that the conditions you're placing on genuine agency are extraordinarily stringent. Perhaps one must be a god to have free will? Might placing the bar so high lead one to misinterpret evidence that humans exercise a significant kind of freedom even though we don't have godlike independence from our environs?
2. As for our flexibility, I'll cite an experiment done on a species of digger wasps (Sphex ichneumoneus) that illustrates deterministic inflexibility:
"When the time comes for egg laying, the wasp Sphex builds a burrow for the purpose and seeks out a cricket which she stings in such a way as to paralyze but not kill it. She drags the cricket into a burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes the burrow, then flies away, never to return. In due course, the eggs hatch and the wasp grubs feed off the paralyzed cricket, which has not decayed, having been kept in the wasp equivalent of deep freeze. To the human mind, such an elaborately organized and seemingly purposeful routine conveys a convincing flavor or logic and thoughtfulness--until more details are examined.
"For example, the Wasp's routine is to bring the paralyzed cricket to the burrow, leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well, emerge and drag the cricket in. If the cricket is moved a few inches away while the wasp is inside making her preliminary inspection, the wasp, on emerging from the burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not inside, and will then repeat the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow to see that everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed a few inches while the wasp is inside, once again she will move the cricket up to the threshold and re-enter the burrow for a final check. The wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight in. One one occasion this procedure was repeated forty times, always with the same result." (This passage is cited from Daniel Dennett's book on free will, Elbow Room, p. 11, italics added).
And so:
(a) Maybe we leap from the fact that we're composed of deterministic systems to the frightening idea that, deep down, we're simply as inflexible as this wasp. We can't really make choices, adjust our behavior on the basis of deliberation, think ourselves flexible in ways significant enough to call ourselves genuinely free, etc., etc.
(b) In any case, it isn't true that "there are no different types of determinism."
To be determined sphexishly, thermostatically, or, say, like a squid, pig or dog, isn't necessarily to be determined just like a human is determined. There may be differences between deterministic systems such that one system allows for agency while another doesn't. And there may be intermediate cases as well. (Were hominid side branches free in important ways?)---
This is enough for now. There's always more, but the one point I've tried to stress is that it's an open question about what follows from the idea that we humans are programmed to the core.
Modified by Cal at Thu, May 16, 2002, 12:25:35
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comparing human and robot programming Re: What follows if we're programmed to the core? -- Cal Top of thread Archive
Posted by: someone ®
05/16/2002, 15:02:58
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Vines and Cal,
Defining Determinism
Cal said, "This is enough for now. There's always more, but the one point I've tried to stress is that it's an open question about what follows from the idea that we humans are programmed to the core."
If I understand Cal correctly, different systems are determined in different ways, according to the type of programming involved. We can't say a wasp and and a rock rolling down a hill are determined in the same fashion.
From what I'm getting out of your exchange, niether of you believe that "free-will" amounts to making choices independent of "programming" (and such a view would be illogical). Cal seems to be arguing that there is enough difference between the way a human is programmed and our vision for how a 'robot' would be programmed that to see ourselves similarily determined would be a mistake. I would agree with this.
I might agree with Vines that 'justice' may be achievable (or at least more consistent) if we could come to understand that we are determined creatures. But to really understand ourselves as determined creatures would require us to understand the nature of our programming. And that knowledge may make determinism in the case of humans seem far less repulsive. From this angle, it may be very desireable for humans to come to an understanding that they are determined creatures.
Computability
Well, I guess I'd be interested Vines, in how similar you see the type of programming going into a robot compared to the type of programming that goes into a human being. Maybe your vision of a robot is simply more humanlike then anything I'm capable of conjuring up.
I'm a little nervous about sounding naive and uninformed here...but best get it out on the table. When your discussing robots, I simply think of very powerful computers. To my understanding, even the most powerful and intelligent looking high level computer operations are the result of mundane low-level decision procedures. In my above post, I used this same kind of language in talking about various competing programs within a human being. Well, for that conversation it seemed fitting, but in reality I don't think its accurate. You probably know where I'm going with this.. (Godel)
"One of the few things more surprising than the incompletability of elementary number theory is the fact that such incompletability can actually have become known to us."--W.V Quine, "Methods of Logic", 218
I'm not suggesting that a human's ability to comprehend an infinity schemata is the only difference between a human and a computer (of today's kind), but it is a very real and important difference. The fact that I can comprehend an infinity schemata means that at a 'low-level' my mind is not breaking the subject matter down through the straight forward type of recursive "reasoning" that a computer goes through to get from point A to point B. So unless there is a good arguement for my reasoning on the subject of computability to be anachronistic, I find it unlikely that my understanding of anything involves the same type of low-level decision procedures that would completely determine computability for a robot and ultimately govern all of the robot's actions. It's today's version of a robot that I would not feel comftorable comparing myslef to; a more advanced robot of a type that we don't know how to build yet? maybe.
Modified by someone at Thu, May 16, 2002, 15:06:42
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Re: Assigning culpability under soft determinism Re: Re: Assigning culpability under soft determinism -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Martin ®
05/12/2002, 20:11:13
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I'm sorry, my good friend, but you must allow your thinking to consider the question from another angle. If you are irrevocably stuck on the opinion that culpability is impossible because actors do not possess free will, then no other alternative can possibly make sense to you, even if you don't adopt it. Let me try again with some examples of what I'm talking about...
A ten year old boy has strict instructions from his mother to return home from school immediately after classes let out that day because she needs to take him to an appointment, and he promises her he'll do just that. But after school, knowing full well of his obligation, he decides to go over to one of his friends to play video games for an hour, missing his appointment and worrying his mother greatly.
When the boy finally returns home, can he legitimately offer the excuse that he didn't come home when he was supposed to because "it was impossible", or even "impossible to want to"? This question isn't a question of free will, it is a question of failing to live up to a promise and an obligation. For surely you don't deny that we seem to have choices, do you? Even you must admit that we certainly appear to be able to consult our moral reasoning and then either follow it or ignore it.
You irrationally neglect the fact that although driven by complete determinacy, the ultimate event chain runs THROUGH our moral reasoning centers! And when our moral reasoning fails (for whatever reason), someone may well be harmed. Assigning culpability based on the failure of the "illusion" of moral choice is COMPLETELY RATIONAL!
Think of it this way: We soft determinists don't directly blame people for their actions, yet we are fully justified in blaming the event chain that led to the harmful outcome. And when we examine the actors that populate the event chain, one or more of them are clearly going to be seen as critical components without which the harmful outcome would be avoided. Consider it like this: Auto insurance companies assign culpability for an accident by examining what actors or events, were they removed from the chain of events, would result in preventing the accident. That driver is then, in a clear example of the tenets of soft determinism, the guilty party and thus should be held responsible.
Let me answer your question about circumstantial freedom more another examples...
Person A enters a 7-11 and robs the clerk because he can't otherwise afford the concert tickets he wants.
Person B enters another convenience store and robs the clerk because there's a man with a gun aimed at his head who has vowed to kill him if he doesn't.
Person A has the complete circumstantial freedom required to take a different course of action, including forgoing both the robbery and the concert.
Person B, obviously, does NOT have the same degree of circumstantial freedom: B's is seriously constrained.
We obviously would be justified in finding "A" culpable for his acts, since he had plenty of circumstantial freedom. In other words, there were no clear, compelling restrictions forcing him to rob the clerk. Whereas person "B" would NOT be considered culpable for the robbery because his circumstantial freedom was severely limited.
Here's one that's a bit more complex: A bank manager is caught in the parking lot of his branch office having stolen all the money in the vault. However, the police soon learn that the manager's wife and child are being held at gunpoint by a gang of violent thugs who have threatened to murder them if he doesn't come up with at least $50 thousand in ransom. The vault only held
$45 thousand, but the manager has no other choice if he wants to try to protect his family's life.Obviously, the manager has very little circumstantial freedom, while the thugs have a great deal more. And even though no one has ultimate free will, there is undeniably a very real asymmetry of circumstantial freedom. The manager thus bears very little culpability while the criminals bear a very great deal.
If you like, Vines, you can think of it as a kind of "relative justice". Think back to the insurance example. One needn't be possessed of ultimate free will to be held culpable for immoral or illegal acts: one only need be an actor in an event chain without whom a negative or harmful result would not occur.
- Martin
Modified by Martin at Sun, May 12, 2002, 20:23:48
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I understand. but I don't agree Re: Re: Assigning culpability under soft determinism -- Martin Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/12/2002, 21:52:11
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Dear Martin:
Thank you for taking the time to continue this interesting discussion. I sense that I have not been clear on certain things. First of all I am not advocating that culpability is impossible in a deterministic frame. You yourself taught me about logic, and how it is a system based on rules that need not correspond to reality or physical law. Along the same lines, culpability can be defined however you want it. What I was simply stating is that culpability cannot be localized in one person, but extends through regression to many others, and that soft-determinists arbitrarily choose where to draw the line defining responsible parties.
You say :
You irrationally neglect the fact that although driven by complete determinacy, the ultimate event chain runs THROUGH our moral reasoning centers! And when our moral reasoning fails (for whatever reason), someone may well be harmed. Assigning culpability based on the failure of the "illusion" of moral choice is COMPLETELY RATIONAL!
It is rational, so what... That doesn't mean that it is just. The stress you put on our moral reasoning centers is completely irrelevant. Our reasoning centers are but one of the many factors contributing to the ultimate action. They are part of the cause, and they function in harmony with the rest of the brain's programs. (The fact that we feel subjectively turmoil because of certain decisions doesn't make the brain's computations less harmonious.) No one is doubting that certain minds bring problems to others and self, but assigning guilt is an arbitrary process if this guilt is restricted to only a portion of the responsible parties.
Your examples are great. They are clear and they work. They, however, illustrate only the necessity of having a judicial system like the one we have. It is intuitive to humans to blame the individual for his/her actions. We perceive ourselves as possessors of agency because we are blind to the workings of our cerebral computations below the horizon of our consiousness. We perceive our actions to be willed by consciousness rather than consciousness being the result of the computations going on in our brain.
Your examples demonstrate the practical value of judicial systems, and the practical aspects of judgment and mitigating circumstances, etc.. I also understand better now what you mean by circumstantial freedom as opposed to limited agency due to constraints.
The example of the banker and the kidnappers is great. We spontaneously feel mitigated in our sense of justice toward the banker, and no mercy toward the thieves, but this is because we are used to looking (conveniently) at people as free agents rather than as determined beings. According to the mental program of each, they are doing exactly what they are programmed to, independent of how they feel about it, and how we feel about what they are doing.
I do not think I am being at all irrational, nor are you, I just think that soft-determinism is based on arbitrary views of justice, and also that when analyzing the reality of determinism it becomes apparent to the mind that the sense of mitigation that we feel for those who do things that are bad because they are not in control extends to all, and that if we are to choose to blame and condemn based on a logical method of judgment, this method can only be just if it places blame on all parties involved in the chain of events. This leads to an obvious regress, and to the unknowlable very quickly, which only demonstrates further the arbitrary nature of the judicial process itself.
The judicial process works only because people intuitively view each other as free agents. It is interesting to note that both you and Cal seem to barely break away from the "free will" mold. You accept intellectually that man's actions are determined, but you do not break away from the arbitrary course of rendering judgment, a process spontaneously arising from man's perception of others as free agents rather than as determined beings. Judicial systems are useful but they are not just. Justice cannot be arbitrary.
One of the very arguments in the supreme court against the death penalty is its arbitrary nature (racist, class discrimation, etc..) and the fact that this arbitrariness is cruel and unusual.... a convenient, and necessary technical way of stating that it is not fair, and hence should be abolished, for it should have no place in a justice system if justice cannot be applied equally. Similarly, a judicial system that arbitrarily determines the boundaries of culpability is not truly just.
TV
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Different formulae, different schema Re: I understand. but I don't agree -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Martin ®
05/13/2002, 01:21:58
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Dear Vines, It is clear that we understand each other's views to a significant depth, but perhaps not deeply enough. I feel that the fault is my own, however. I don't think I've done an adequate job of getting my thinking across, so let me try a different tack...
We both agree that moral culpability requires some type of freedom.
Hard Determinists like yourself (as well as those who reject determinism and defend free will) are convinced of the truth of the equation:Freedom = IndeterminismBut I submit that's just ONE possible definition of freedom, which has the irreparable flaw of being inconsistent with reality.I've given a completely different definition that seems quite sound, rational, compelling, and best of all, fully consistent with the real world:
Freedom = Lack of physical or cognitive restraintsOn what possible grounds can you call that "arbitrary"?? You emphasize this alleged arbitrariness very strongly; it is at the root of your rebuttal to soft determinism. But is my view in fact "arbitrary"? You may not agree with my position, but it certainly does not entail an arbitrary definition or logic! I cannot see how it is arbitrary at all.Why do you insist in asserting that we soft determinists here have largely failed to "break away from the 'free will' mold? You mistake us severely. The truth is that we simply do not agree that your purportedly axiomatic formula is a given. We define freedom in a way that is both possible and is fully consistent with reality. You, on the other hand, do not.
Look, we both agree that assigning responsibility is necessary, don't we? Haven't I at least established that point beyond dispute? So what, then, is by far the least arbitrary means of assigning it (if you insist on putting it in those terms)? The insurance adjuster's philosophy and method are extremely logical and sound and as far from arbitrariness as I can imagine! If you were circumstantially free to act differently and you didn't (even though you weren't ultimately free, which is an impossibility and thus irrelevant), you are justifiably culpable for the outcome. The only time you are not fully culpable is when other's actions also directly contributed to the outcome (e.g., accomplices), as long as they also were circumstantially free to act otherwise.
Yes, humanity's outlook and philosophy of justice must adapt once we realize that ultimate free will does not exist. But the possibility of justice does not disappear entirely as a result! Even you agree with that (in your reply to someone, above). This seems to imply that you also realize to some extent that your logic is somehow flawed. For if you fully accepted your own reasoning, it would follow that you must reject the very possibility of justice!
You insist on viewing the question of moral responsibility from a metaphysical perspective, whereas I see it as an empirical issue. Empirically speaking, we need NOT be free in some ultimate metaphysical way in order for justice to be possible; all that is necessary to be able to justifiably assign culpability is that the actors have the circumstantial freedom to act other than they did. Most of us are possessed of that kind of freedom, and those who are not (the restrained, the coerced, or the insane, for examples) are not held responsible. This is an idea that is eminently sound and rational, philosophically defensible, and most of all: IT WORKS.
The reality of universal determinism requires us to adapt our conceptions and attitudes, to turn our minds to an alternative approach for assigning moral culpability. Soft determinism is that alternative, and with it, justice can indeed prevail.
- Martin
Modified by Martin at Mon, May 13, 2002, 01:32:38
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Indeterminism? Re: Different formulae, different schema -- Martin Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/13/2002, 03:35:46
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How else would you define "free will"? Re: Indeterminism? -- The Vines Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Martin ®
05/13/2002, 03:41:40
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If, as you argue, ultimate free will is required for justly assigning culpability, and that determinism makes free will impossible, what else can you mean by free will but the logical negation of determinism, to wit, indeterminism?
- Martin
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Re: How else would you define "free will"? Re: How else would you define "free will"? -- Martin Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/13/2002, 04:58:01
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I negate that free-will actually exists beyond our subjective impression of it. I agree with your points as to the useful nature of the soft-determinist view. In practice I would consider myself a soft-determinist but simply because there is no better solution. I mean what can we do to protect ourselves from harm? Gosh, I have a neighbor who strikes me as a possible sex offender, and I am always careful with my kids.... what can I do but judge??? We must protect ourselves in the face of our ignorance of what makes another tick.
But having said that, I would never say that my position is just, as you do, I would limit myself to saying that it is necessary. In reality justice is an irrelevant concept because freedom is an illusion, but because we have a sense of justice then it is relevant to us as humans.
In conclusion I have two main points of disagreement with soft-determinists: practical and conceptual.
Practical(based on our practical illusionary view of the reality of agency): I cannot accept that the soft-determinist view is "just." How could soft-determinism be just if it is arbitrary in assigning culpability to the offender and doesn't apply the same measure to those who contribute in the programming of the latter. In essence, our inability to see what makes another tick makes judicial systems automatically partial because we are not able to measure where programming came from, and hence we are unable to divide condemnation to all parties involved in the negative chain of events leading to crime. So on a pratical level there is no complete justice, only partial. The soft-determinist view is consequently useful and even necessary, but not just.
Conceptual: Justice is an illusion because freedom is an illusion. The whole idea of condemnation because of offense is irrelevant for offense is the result of a program. The idea of justice is relevant only within the illusion of free-agency. If we were able to crack the code of the brain and look into a mind, then the soft-determinist philosophy would be obsolete, because it would no longer be necessary. There would no longer be any sense in rationalizing its appropriateness.
TV
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Re: Different formulae, different schema Re: Different formulae, different schema -- Martin Top of thread Archive
Posted by: Gunnar ®
05/13/2002, 03:53:08
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After having read this thread, I feel logically compelled to agree with your view on culpability and "circumstantial freedom." I found it to be very clearly and rationally presented. Like you (and most people, I suppose) I find the idea that we have free will to be a comfortable idea, even though I must reluctantly admit the strong probability that our sense of having free will is illusory. In this case, I think it is a useful illusion, if it can still be called that when we realize it is an illusion. I agree that whether it is illusory or not, we have little choice but to act as if it were real, in most circumstances.
I get the impression after reading both you and TV's inputs to this thread that he is not as much in disagreement with you on this issue as he seems to think he is. In any case, it was a pleasure to follow the interaction between you two on this issue.
Highest regards, as always!
Gunnar
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Alright...lets back up (edited) Re: Different formulae, different schema -- Martin Top of thread Archive
Posted by: The Vines ®
05/13/2002, 04:32:18
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Dear Martin:
I really don't think Freedom=Indeterminism. I don't know how I gave that impression. There is no merit to that concept IMO. Rather I believe that freedom is an illusion humans have derived from their inability to perceive the computations of their subconscious mind. In essence, I do not believe freedom is real, but rather just a subjective interpretation of reality based on a lack of knowledge. As a consequence I also reject your idea Freedom = Lack of physical or cognitive restraints.
You say:
Yes, humanity's outlook and philosophy of justice must adapt once we realize that ultimate free will does not exist. But the possibility of justice does not disappear entirely as a result! Even you agree with that (in your reply to someone, above). This seems to imply that you also realize to some extent that your logic is somehow flawed. For if you fully accepted your own reasoning, it would follow that you must reject the very possibility of justice!My logic is not flawed in regards, because as I have been saying, freedom is simply an illusion, and justice is simply a definition pertaining to a specific logical system, and it doesn't need to correspond to reality. Personally, I think justice is also an illusion, for in the end where there is no freedom(because the cause behind action is always a program) there is no real culpability, and hence justice is obsolete. What I said both to you and someone is that these concepts are currently useful to us, for we have no other way of protecting ourselves from harm.
Natural selection provided us with this adaptation because it is a useful tool in surviving. It goes something like this:
______________________________________
Man A thinks he is a free-agent because he does not perceive the reality of the fact that he acts entirely based on a program where his very mind and body are the computer. He perceives that his conscious mind is in control of his actions, rather than the reality that his conscious mind is the result of these computations. He feels he is in control because that is part of the program itself. He also feels a subjective feeling of responsibility for his actions. This sense is also part of his programming. His nature has provided him with a mind that allows him to subjectively feel happy when he does something that promotes survival both for himself and his group. This adaptation emerged because Man A is essentially a social-type animal equipped with a social-type computer program. He also is equipped with the ability to feel bad when he does something harmful.As a consequence Man A thinks Man B is also a free agent and that Man B is also responsible for his actions... In reality Man B is equipped with all these programs too.
While Man A and Man B view themselves as free agents and morally responsible one toward the other, this is only an illusion given by the very cognitive programs their physiology has equipped them with.
_________________________________________Now currently, we cannot do without this social tool we call judicial system. Humans would not hear of foregoing the right to judge. They feel they must. It is obviously a strong drive. That, along with the fact that we do not have the technological ability to investigate a man's neural programming is why I say that judicial systems are currently necessary to protect ourselves from harmful possible events in the future, as you eloquently stated.
If we did however have a technological tool that would allow us to understand the programming of a mind, then our judicial system would be obsolete.
Yes I do insist that soft-determinists fail to break away from the mold of "free-will."
[Martin]: We define freedom in a way that is both possible and is fully consistent with reality.
Freedom is neither possible, nor consistent with reality, it is only consistent within the logical system founded on our subjective perception of being free agents, and thus morally responsible.
[Martin]: You insist on viewing the question of moral responsibility from a metaphysical perspective, whereas I see it as an empirical issue.
I think it is quite the contrary. I view moral responsibility exactly from an empirical perspective and that is why I have concluded that it does not exist, which is completely counterintuitive, and I could have never made this conclusion unless empirical data regarding the brain's functioning had been given me.
I think instead that you view the issue from a metaphysical point of view because you have not broken away from the concept of man's freedom. You have not proven that such a thing exists, and you cannot because you would have to prove that man is free in the sense that he can act independent of a program. For if man acts based on the directives of a program, then his sense of freedom is only an actual component of the program itself. To assume contrary is metaphysical, and not verifiable. If you view your position as empirical it is simply because you are using an incorrect method of analysis because it incorporates the subjective view that freedom can exist. Because this basic concept is metahysical, the empirical approach you claim is without merit, because one of its basic principles is not verifiable. It is not that dissimilar from Mikwut saying that he uses emprical methods in proving God exists because, as he claims, his cognitive sense of God is the fruit of experimentation with prayer and meditation. Do not be offended, but you are both founding your empiricism on subjective cognitive perceptions that do not correspond to reality, or at least are not verifiable. Freedom is only within the program, hence only an illusion. I would bet my money that you actually think the same, that man's freedom is an illusion, though you have not stated that in this post (I think), and if you do, how could that work with soft determinism? It would make the foundation inconsistent, it would seem. As I said, soft-determinism could be useful but not just.
I agree that the soft-determinist approach works. We have no other way of protecting ourselves from crime. Perhaps in the future, if some kind of technology were available allowing us to crack the code of cerebral programming we could analyze each others programs and perhaps arrive at a much higher reality of justice, where now we live in an imaginary sense of justice, which produces a system that works,but which is not really fair.
In reality Martin, we live in a nation that still condemns to death. A nation that even condemns retarded people... The world is ignorant and the base tendencies of vengeance, hatred, greed, pride, etc..., are controlling to a great extent the reality of our future as a species. In this context the soft-determinist philosophy of justice works, but I think it is a necessary evil because we are unable to objectively verify what is in a man's mind, hence we cannot effectively re-condition, nor can we verify that the reconditioning has been effective. If this were possible then the soft-determinist view would no longer be useful.
TV
Modified by The Vines at Thu, May 16, 2002, 09:18:09
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