I find myself wondering whether religion manages to create (in any favorable way) the following:1. A system of morality
2. A "device of social legitimization"
I'd argue (I think Edis would agree given what I've read from him in other writings) that religious-mythical ways of thinking don't exactly create "systems of morality" so much as provide readily intelligible explanations for, and elaborate various developments of, a set of moral dispositions that nature itself has in good part given us through our evolution as intelligent, social beings.
In which case these religious ways of moral thinking would inevitably be in close contact with these basic moral dispositions and the kinds of morally freighted problems that our natural human situation inevitably hands to us: Questions of fairness, problems of securing cooperation, ways of handling and reducing conflict, and, indeed, ways of enjoining people to do often good things they may not be readily inclined to under certain circumstances, and so forth. If so, then it would be extremely unlikely that all religious moral outlooks would fail to have something, perhaps quite a lot, favorable to them. At minimum it would be almost certain that at least some religious systems have something favorable to recommend them from even a throughly naturalistic point of view.
In fact, I'm surprised you'd go so far as to say that "religion" doesn't "create (in any favorable way) . . . a system of morality." What could that mean? Would it imply that any religious person acting, say, benevolently towards an outcast, or courageously defending a victim of persecution, has done it only in spite of the moral void that constitutes religious moral outlooks? Even if these people did what they did precisely to measure up to their religious convictions?
Yes, religions deal with these issues, but are their solutions they really "tried and true"? I'm the first to admit that it isn't easy to develop these things in a way that will affect everyone in a positive way, but I'm not sure I'm ready to concede the victory to religion on the development of morality.
I'd wager it's practically impossible to develop a morals that affects "everyone in a positive way." And I'm certain Edis isn't expecting that of any moral system, and then saying naturalistic moral outlooks fall short on that score.
Why? Look at his essay's thesis on pragmatic rationality, which, if true, would precisely exclude a general solution to the question of morals in the sense of some moral system capable of proving positive for every person, whether religious or naturalistic. You might wish to reread the essay keeping in mind his distinction between a rationality rooted in purely cognitive interests vs. pragmatic rationality. From your post I suspect its significance for the essay's claims didn't quite get into your conception of its claims. At any rate, the distinction's central to all his claims, and if one misses its significance, then one's response to him simply ends up being beside the points he's making.
Among other things, it isn't a matter for him of "conceding the victory of religion on the development of morals" as if it were a matter of whether religion and irreligion were vying for the best, let alone "perfect," general solution to the problem of developing moral systems. It's rather a matter of acknowledging, in light of the nature of pragmatic rationality, certain advantages that religious-mythical modes of moral thought often have, for various people and societies, over non-mythical naturalistic modes of moral reasoning.
[And remember: He notes that many religious outlooks can prove, as he puts it, "notoriously oppressive." It also isn't a matter of religious-mythical thinking in general being superior to irreligious naturalism when it comes to morals; it's a matter of it having available to itself things quite useful given many of the needs to which our pragmatic rationality addresses itself.]
As for a "device of social legitimization," I'm not sure it is altogether favorable to have such a thing--especially if it includes denying legitimacy to individuals who are benign but fail to meet the standards.
For the moment we might want to put the issue of "devices of social legitimation" somewhat on hold, because his account of the significance of these devices again gets its meaning from his thesis on pragmatic rationality.
At any rate, while it's hard to say exactly what you're saying here in referring to "benign" individuals who "fail to meet the standards" set by a device of social legitimation, I get a sense that I share with you a sense that religious accounts of the moral life very often overshoot the target, taking benign folk to be harmful or even demonic.
One of the great achievements of the modern Western world is the extent to which its ideals of toleration, freedom of religion and association, of human rights, and so forth, help to mitigate this tendency. But of course one can be religious in a significant way and yet incorporate these ideals into one's religio-moral outlook. Look, e.g., at Edis' remarks on the prevalence of individualized modes of mythical thinking common especially in Western Europe, where traditional theism has declined dramatically.
[Also, this tendency may be partly rooted in our natural tendency to confuse what we think is contaminated and impure with what's morally pernicious, one that certain religious conceptions exacerbate and which modern ideals, again, mitigate. "The Blank Slate," a book by Steven Pinker (recommended by Craig C., BTW), has an interesting chapter on this phenomenon.]
What matters for our lives is whether certain individuals in today's society will be better off without religion, and whether these individuals will do a better job of contributing to society. What are the types of individuals who would benefit, and what are the types that would not? I don't have the answers, although I have some ideas.
Edis doesn't dispute this. He explicitly claims that he himself, and most people he knows from his professional life, where naturalists are as "common as dirt," do just fine absent religiosity. Nor does he argue that there aren't currently religious people who'd be better off adopting naturalism. Nor that secularism, were it to make inroads on various contemporary religious societies, wouldn't amount to an improvement for some religious and certainly some irreligious folk.
I do have a sense, in any case, that you missed the main thrusts of his essay, and that, perhaps, you'd be able to formulate and develop better some of your intuitions on these issues were you to engage his essay with a more accurate sense of its arguments.
Regards, Cal
